Reauthorization: Williams/Coleman Compromise (October 27, 1990): Memorandum 03 by Fitzpatrick, James F.
University of Rhode Island
DigitalCommons@URI
Reauthorization: Williams/Coleman Compromise
(October 27, 1990)
Education: National Endowment for the Arts and
Humanities, Subject Files I (1973-1996)
1990
Reauthorization: Williams/Coleman Compromise
(October 27, 1990): Memorandum 03
James F. Fitzpatrick
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/pell_neh_I_79
This Memorandum is brought to you for free and open access by the Education: National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities, Subject Files I
(1973-1996) at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Reauthorization: Williams/Coleman Compromise (October 27, 1990)
by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fitzpatrick, James F., "Reauthorization: Williams/Coleman Compromise (October 27, 1990): Memorandum 03" (1990).
Reauthorization: Williams/Coleman Compromise (October 27, 1990). Paper 13.
http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/pell_neh_I_79/13
ARNOLD & PORTER 
October 9; 1990 
:::~:=e~ F. F~U~a~fi¢~ pPr 
R~: C:r.i. t;i.que of Co111?t.i. t~ti.<;m~l Il?l?\lel? F~il?~Ci 
by Section 103(a) in. Williams/Coleman 
Compromise Version ·Of R.R. 48~~- __ --~ _ 
Although the new compromise version of H.R. 4825 
purport$ to deny funding only for obscene works based on 
the supreme court's Miil.er v. California standards, in 
fact. section lOJ(a) of the bill may create new, 
unconstitutional grant approval standards. Section 
103 (b) reqtiire!; t_hat, in grantmaking regulatdons and 
pl:."ocedures whieh the NE.A shall promulgate, the Chairman 
11 shail ensure'' that applications a:re jud,g~Q, nQt Qnly in 
terms of artcistic excellence and merit but also 11 takin9 
into consideration 9ene~~l E?t~:nda:c:ds of dece_ncy and 
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the 
Ainerican public." .This provisi.ol'.l c;:l.ea::rly §;et~ up two 
new fundin9 app:;-ov~l l:nirdles, beyond the obscenity 
criterion, whieh are patently unconsti tut.i.c;m~l ! 
What do these new "1?ta11d,c:t..:c:ci~" m~an? How can one 
deterir.iine whether a particular work of art is within 
''general standa:rCil? of decency" or respects "the divers~ 
l:;>~liefl? and values of the A:iilerican public''? II? 
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:Michelangelo's David "decent"? Would a paroQ.y c:>f 
revered figures like Washington, Jefferson or Lincoln be 
"disrespectful" to our t:tilttiral heritage? 
l~.Jlq what :i..E? "tlie ~erican public''? As the 
supreme court has emphasized, "People in different 
states; va~y in t:bei:r tae;tee; an<i attitudes, and this 
dive:r;e:i..ty :i..e; not tQ pe st~a?l<tle<;i by the absolutism of 
im osed unif o:rmi t -. '' 
-- p - - - -- -- - - - -- - _ y Millet v! California, 413 Q.$. 15, 
33 (1973). Whose ''diverse beiie:fs'' .... ,.,. Fundamentalist 
Chri~tic;in~! Q:r;thQc}o~ Q"ewiE?h, MQE?J.em, Ch~:l,1:1t:ia?l Sc:l,em::e, 
unitarian, or all of them -- provide the test for 
":re§pectftJlne~i;;"? Mid wboi;;e "valuei;;"? 
These funding standards are so broad as to have 
no specific content meaning; they permit an 
aQ111i_riii;it:ratqr to make speech...;based decisions without any 
fixed standards. Consequently, they will c;:li:ill c~eat:i:ve 
output because an artist simply will have no clear 
indication of their meaning. Aii of these 
considerations have led the supreme cou:rt c;:c;ms:i.i;;t:.ently 
to hold vague and amorphous content standards such as 
these to be unconstitutional. 
Moreover, these provisions ~a:l,se aga:l,:ri_ ~e~ious 
procedural concerns which were eff~ct.i.vely <iealt with in 
tlie Q):)i;icen:i..ty conte:>et by removing the basic 
constitutional 9-et:e~inations from a bureaucrat's desk 
and placing tbe:m in the hands of a court. These two new 
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standards could be read to require the Chairman to be 
prepareci tQ c:le:f1end to any public of-:fici(ll that a 
:pa~ticu:t,ar 9rant w~s qe9E!rl't; a,nc:i_ ~E!$PE!Qtful, PE!C~l.l~E! thE! 
Chairman may be said 'to "ensure" 'that NE.A gran'ts are so 
endowed. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized tha't s'tandards 
of Vagueness are especially stringent in tbe Fi:r$1; 
Amendment conte)C1;. In Hyn~s y. Mavor of Oradell, 425 
u •.. s. 610, 620 ( 1976), the Court stressed that "stricte~ 
standards of permissible statutory v~9Ue!le$$ ~~Y ~E! 
applied to a statute having a x:>otentia11y inhibiting 
effe<::t on §peech; a man may t.he less be required to act 
~t :t:iif3 peril bere, because 'the free dissemination of 
ideas may be the loser. '' 
Shuttlesworth v~ City_ of: Birm-:i..ngh_am., 394 U.S. 
147, 150-51 (1969), exel'il.plifie~ tlle Co\l,rt•s intolerance 
of ~qcti ~Jl1Q~PtlQUf31Y vague standards as 11decency 11 in the 
conte~t of :ref3tt"ictions upon First. Amendment :freedoms. 
fn Shuttlesworth, the court st~c1t down as 
uncons'titutdonally vague a statute that E!l1C~o~c:he4 on 
First Amendment freedoms b¥ permitting c:ity officials 'to 
deny ~ p~_:rgqe permit if the officials believed that 
•)decency, gooQ. order, morals or convenience require th<it 
;ft be refused" (emphasis added). The cou~t ~t~t;ed tha't 
"i:;ubjest.ing the exercise of Fi:rst @en®ent freedoms to 
[rest:rictions] without narrow, objective, and definite 
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standards . • • is ti.ficOnsti tqtional. i• Id.. ~ee also 
Pope v. Iiiinois, 481 u. s. 4·97, 504 (1987) cse:a.1ia., .J. 
concurring) (content restrictions on art wouid require 
the interpretation ot a:rtwo:r~s thllt !Dc;!,Y be ~l.l)]:::>igv.ou_$, 
obscure, or unintelligible to some, and therefore are 
especiaiiy prone to arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement); Erzoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 
u~s. 205, 213 (1975) (statute barring depictions of 
nudity is unconstj.tqt;l.c;m~lly va,9"Y,~; it ":migb~ P+ob.i):)1t 
newsreel shots oft.he opening of an art exhibit"). 
The notion of "disrespectf'1_l" $peech ie; similarly 
unconstitutionally vague. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson, 343 u.s. 495 (1952); the Court struck down a 
iicensin9 requi:re~ent tbat allowed "sacrilegious" films 
to be censored. The cou_rt wrc>'t~: 
In seeking to apply the board and ail-
inclusive defifiitioh Of HsacrilegiOUS 11 
. • . the censor is set adrift upon a 
boundless sea amid a myriad o~ 
conflicting currents of :religious 
views, witl'l no charts but those 
provided by the most vocal ancl powe:rfu_1 
orthoc:lo~ie5'· • • • Under such a 
standard "the most careful and tolera11t 
censor wouid find it virtually 
impossible to avoid favoring one 
religion over another. 
Id. ~t ~04-05. In his concurring opinion in Burstyn, 
Justice Fran~fu_:rtei; 5'tated that "[t]o allow such vague, 
indefinable power$ of censorship is bound to have 
stultifying c9n_s;equences on the creat,ive procei;s of 
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iit.erature and art • .-. Id. at 531. Likewise, in Buiifrog 
.F.ilms v. ~-i~~, 847 F.2g 502, Sl.3-14 (9t.h. Ci:t:!. J,;988), t.he 
Ninth ci:rc-uit st~c]{ down a,s ~ncc;m~tit:~tionally va,giJ.e 
regulatione tl'l~t d~n:ied c:::ertification tQ 1t1.ateriale 
''which appear to have as their purpose or effect to 
attack or discredit economic; rel,;i.gi¢4$, or p¢litic:a1 
views or practices." Id. ~t. ~o~.. Tb~ Co~-~t Sitl:!e$s;eQ. 
t.bat "[s]uch content-based distinctions are patently 
offensive to the First Amendment.'' Id. at 511. 
Even setting aside the.l.J; inh.e:r~nt va,gv.ene$i;, the 
standards set by FI·R~ 4e~~ .rv,n afoul of long-established 
First Amendment principles. While congress may 
coni;;titutionally impose sanctions for obscene speech 
wl1Jcb ii; a foJ:"ID, of expression not. protected by the First 
Amendment -- H.R. 4.825 reaches far beyond the obscene in 
these two new standards. Under weii-estabi.ished 
const.i 'C:tit.ionai principles; '-'indecent" speech. ~nd 
''disrespectful'-' speech a:re botll protected by the First 
Amendment, which flatly forbid.s :rei;;t:ric::tions on the 
e~ression of an idea oh the mere ground that the ide~ 
may be offensive or disagreeable~ 
First, "i11q,ec:::ent 11 speech does not. fall within the 
scc;:>pe of t.he obscenity exception apg, tberefore, is 
accorc;l.e4 :P:ro~Q. First Amendment protection. In Sable 
communications v. FCC, 109 s. ct. at 2836, t.he supreme 
Court stressed that '' [ s] e~u_g.l expression which is 
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i~nciece:rrt ~:rqt nqt c;>l;>e;cene ie; p~c;>tecteci l;>y the f j_~st 
Amendment.'' In FCC v ~ Pacif~ca Foundation, the court 
noted. that ''t:he normai d.e:finit:ion of 1 indecency• merely 
refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of 
morality.'' 438 u.s. 726, 740 (197$). The co~rt 
emphasized that "indecent" materials are not necessarily 
obscene, and that materials can be ''indecent'~ even in 
tne absence of prurient appec;ll.. Id. Merely 11 i_ndecent" 
works do not meet. the Miller test: and are therefore 
- . 1 Pt'QtecteQ. l;_>y tbe First; Amendment. Thus, whatever may 
be meant by "deeency" ""'""' and the term may wel.i be 
unconstitutionally va9ue -- the Fi:r~t Alnend.ment 
stringently limits ~est~ict;i.on§> Ql'I. :i_._nciec;:erit §lpeegb, <;>~ 
art. 
second, the propQ~eQ. criterion that artistic 
works "respect . di~erse beliefs and values" is 
part:icuiarly repugnant to court p~ec:ecient. 'rlle 
regulation of "disrespectful" speech is compieteiy 
inconsistent with the "bedrock p~inc:iple ~ncierlying the 
that the government may not 
prohibit the expresi,;ion Qf ~n idea simply because 
society finds the idea i:tsei:f offensive or 
1 In Carlin Communications v. FCC, the ~eC:Qllcl Circcuit 
emphasized that "Wer~ the te:rlJl 'inqec;:ent' to be given 
meaning other than Miller Qpscenity, we believe the 
statute wquJ,ci l;:>e unconstitutional." 837 F.2d 546, ~60 
(2d Cir.), cert •. denied, l,09 s.ct:. 305 (1988). 
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disagreeable." Id. at ~544~ 'rbui;, even i;pee9b t.bCit ii; 
''doubtless 9ross and repu,gnant. in the eye~ of 111.<:>s;t" or 
that "may h_ave a.n adverse elll.otiQnal impact Qn the 
audience" is protected by the First Amendment. Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. a76, 879, 882 {1988). 
1
' (AJ ny sug9es1;.io:ri thCit tbe government's; interest 
i.n ~n1pp~es;s;ing sPeeQb becomes; more weighty as popular 
opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First 
Amendment." United states v. Eichman, 58 L.W. at 4746. 
cme fu11c;:tic:m of a.~t ii:;; t9 c;:na.llenge, not merely 
ente:rtain, its viewers: 
[AJ principal "function of tree i;;peec;:b 
under ou~ i;y~tem Qf gQvernment is to 
invite c;lii;p~te. It may ind.eed ];>est 
serve its; high P'Y.!:P9se wnen it induces 
a conqition 9! Yn:res;t:, creates 
dissatisfaction with conditions as they 
are, or even stirs people to ~nge:r." 
Texas v. Johnson, 109 s .. ct. at 2544, ctUOtinq Terminiello 
v. Chicago, 337 u.s. l, 4 (l.949). 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, the decency and disrespect provisi9:ris; of 
section 103 (a) in the com:p:rol'l)ise veri;;ic:>n of ll.R. 4925 
have serious const:i.tutio11Cil implications. Because the 
subject matter of the artwor~ i~ c9nstitutionally 
p~Qtected, Congress cannot. d.iscri:ndnate on t:t:ie l:;>~i;ii; of 
that suJ:>ject matter in making grants. As the Supreme 
court ruled long a9o: 
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Under our system of government there is 
~n ~ccQ;J.1.U11QciCltion ~0¥ the wicle$t 
varieties of tastes and ideas. What is 
good literature, what has educational 
value, what is i;efined public: 
infonnation, what is good art, varies 
with individual.s as it does from one 
generation-to another. There dotibtless 
would be a contrariety of views 
concerning Cervantes' Don Qp.j.xot~, 
Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis, or 
Zola's Nana. But a requirement that 
literature or art conform to some norm 
i>resc~ibe4 i;,y. ~ii-otficl~i ~J,U~(;~i;-Qf-~n 
iQ.eQl,ogy f cn~~:i.gn to QlJ.~r $Y~t.em. • • • 
f:i:;"Ql!l tfie IlJ.lJ.ltitqcie of coID.peting 
offerings the public: will pick and 
choose. 
Hannegan v. Esau_ire, Inc., :327 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1946). 
